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MANECLANG v. IAC

This case has been cited 48 times or more.

2016-01-13
JARDELEZA, J.
DFI owns an 800-hectare banana plantation ("original plantation") in Alejal, Carmen, Davao.[5] Pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 ("CARL"), commercial farms shall be subject to compulsory acquisition and distribution,[6] thus the original plantation was covered by the law. However, the Department of Agrarian Reform ("DAR") granted DFI a deferment privilege to continue agricultural operations until 1998.[7] Due to adverse marketing problems and observance of the so-called "lay-follow" or the resting of a parcel of land for a certain period of time after exhaustive utilization, DFI closed some areas of operation in the original plantation and laid off its employees.[8] These employees petitioned the DAR for the cancellation of DFI's deferment privilege alleging that DFI already abandoned its area of operations.[9] The DAR Regional Director recalled DFI's deferment privilege resulting in the original plantation's automatic compulsory acquisition and distribution under the CARL.[10] DFI filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. It then appealed to the DAR Secretary.[11]
2015-08-24
CARPIO, J.
In Department of Agrarian Reform v. Trinidad Valley Realty & Development Corporation,[165] Trinidad Valley Realty & Development Corporation and the other respondents (Trinidad Valley Realty & Development Corporation, et al.) are registered owners of a parcel of land in Negros Oriental.[166] The Department of Agrarian Reform placed a substantial portion of the land under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 or Republic Act No. 6657.[167] Administrative Order No. 10, Series of 1989, Administrative Orders No. 12, Series of 1989, No. 9, Series of 1990, and No. 2, Series of 1996, Administrative Order No. 10, Series of 1990, Joint DAR-LRA Memorandum Circular No. 20, Series of 1997, and Executive Order No. 405, among others, (collectively, Orders) were then issued.[168]
2015-08-17
LEONEN, J.
The DARAB is the quasi-judicial tribunal that has the primary jurisdiction to determine whether there is a tenancy relationship between adverse parties.[87] This court has held that "judicial determinations [of the a DARAB] have the same binding effect as judgments and orders of a regular judicial body."[88] Disputes under the jurisdiction of the DARAB include controversies relating to:tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.[89]
2015-08-17
LEONEN, J.
In this case, records are bereft as to whether private complainant appealed the DARAB Decision. Thus, it is presumed that the Decision has long lapsed into finality.[131] It is also established that private complainant participated in the initial stages of the DARAB proceedings.[132] Therefore, the issue of the existence of a tenancy relationship is final as between the parties. We cannot collaterally review the DARAB's findings at this stage. The existence of the final Decision that tenancy exists creates serious doubts as to the guilt of the accused.
2015-04-24
CARPIO, J.
In Department of Agrarian Reform v. Trinidad Valley Realty & Development Corporation,[165] Trinidad Valley Realty & Development Corporation and the other respondents (Trinidad Valley Realty & Development Corporation, et al.) are registered owners of a parcel of land in Negros Oriental.[166] The Department of Agrarian Reform placed a substantial portion of the land under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 or Republic Act No. 6657.[167] Administrative Order No. 10, Series of 1989, Administrative Orders No. 12, Series of 1989, No. 9, Series of 1990, and No. 2, Series of 1996, Administrative Order No. 10, Series of 1990, Joint DAR-LRA Memorandum Circular No. 20, Series of 1997, and Executive Order No. 405, among others, (collectively, Orders) were then issued.[168]
2015-01-26
DEL CASTILLO, J.
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, and the municipal circuit trial courts.[33] On the other hand, the DAR is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and has exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform.[34] As DAR's adjudicating arm,[35] it is the DARAB that has exclusive and original jurisdiction involving all agrarian disputes. Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, Section 3(d) defines an 'agrarian dispute' as follows:(d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers' associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
2014-11-24
PERALTA, J.
On March 1, 2001, respondents filed a Complaint for the Determination of Just Compensation before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando City, Pampanga, docketed as Agrarian Case No. 02-001.[6] Thereafter, on October 15, 2003, they filed with the RTC an Omnibus Motion for the Issuance of an Order Authorizing Plaintiffs to Withdraw Amount Deposited in their Name and Amount to be Withdrawn Must be Fixed in Accordance with Section 18 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657.[7]
2014-10-22
BERSAMIN, J.
In the now assailed decision promulgated on July 27, 2011,[34] the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the OP. It declared that prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on June 15, 1988 and even after the passage of Municipal Resolution No. 16-98 on March 4, 1998, the Dakila property was an agricultural land; that there was no valid reclassification because Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code) and Memorandum Circular No. 54 required an ordinance, not a resolution; and that findings of the DAR on the Dakila property being an agricultural land should be respected,[35] subject to the clarification to the effect that its determination was only limited to the issue of whether the Dakila property was an agricultural land covered by Republic Act No. 6657.
2014-10-15
LEONEN, J.
Republic Act No. 6657 became effective on June 15, 1988, and it covered all public and private lands, including lands of the public domain suited for agriculture.[46] Upon its enactment, questions arose as to the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to approve or disapprove applications for conversion of agricultural land to non-agricultural. Then Agrarian Reform Secretary Florencio B. Abad (Secretary Abad) was of the opinion that laws prior to Republic Act No. 6657 authorized the Department of Agrarian Reform, together with the Department of Local Government and Community Development and the Human Settlements Commission, to allow or disallow conversions. In response to Secretary Abad's query, the Department of Justice issued Opinion No. 44 on March 16, 1990, written by then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon. The opinion, reproduced in full, states: S i r:
2014-10-01
LEONEN, J.
The exemption orders clearly provide that the lands were reclassified to non-agricultural prior to June 15, 1988, or prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL).[58]
2014-07-10
LEONEN, J.
2) Before the lapse of ten (10) years but after the lapse of five (5) years, a beneficiary may dispose of the acquired land if it "ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value"[113] with its residential, commercial, or industrial use.
2014-07-09
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
While the LBP is charged[54] with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under the land reform program and the compensation to be paid for their taking,[55] guided by the records/ documents contained in the claim folders,[56] it must be emphasized that its valuation is considered only as an initial determination, which is not conclusive. Verily, it is the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, that should make the final determination of just compensation[57] and which has the final say on what the amount of just compensation will be[58] pursuant to the well-settled rule that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function.[59] This rule notwithstanding, a review of the records, nonetheless, impels the Court to order the remand of the case to the RTC considering the failure of both the RTC and the CA to consider the factors enumerated under Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, in determining the just compensation for the subject portion.
2014-06-09
DEL CASTILLO, J.
Seeking the denial of the Petition, respondent in his Comment[38] insists that the ejectment case is intertwined with the CARP Law,[39] since petitioners' titles were obtained by virtue of the agrarian laws, which thus places the controversy within the jurisdiction of the DARAB; that under the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, specifically Rule II, Section 1, paragraph 1.4[40] thereof, cases involving the ejectment and dispossession of tenants and/or leaseholders fall within the jurisdiction of the DARAB; that under such rule, the one who ejects or dispossesses the tenant need not be the landowner or lessor, and could thus be anybody, including one who has no tenurial arrangement with the evicted/ dispossessed tenant.
2013-12-11
BRION, J.
Notably, under Section 36(1) of R.A. No. 3844, as amended by Section 7 of R.A. No. 6389,[55] declaration by the department head, upon recommendation of the National Planning Commission, to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes, terminates the right of the agricultural lessee to continue in its possession and enjoyment. The approval of the conversion, however, is not limited to the authority of the DAR or the courts. In the case of Pasong Bayabas Farmers Asso., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[56] and again in Junio v. Secretary Garilao,[57] the Court essentially explained that the reclassification and conversion of agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6657, on June 15, 1988, was a coordinated effort of several government agencies, such as local government units and the HSRC.
2012-04-24
VELASCO JR., J.
HLI contends that since the SDP is a modality which the agrarian reform law gives the landowner as alternative to compulsory coverage, then the FWBs cannot be considered as owners and possessors of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita at the time the SDP was approved by PARC.[4] It further claims that the approval of the SDP is not akin to a Notice of Coverage in compulsory coverage situations because stock distribution option and compulsory acquisition are two (2) different modalities with independent and separate rules and mechanisms.  Concomitantly, HLI maintains that the Notice of Coverage issued on January 2, 2006 may, at the very least, be considered as the date of "taking" as this was the only time that the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita were placed under compulsory acquisition in view of its failure to perform certain obligations under the SDP.[5]
2012-03-21
SERENO, J.
The DAR claims that, following the mandate of Presidential Decree No. 27 (P.D. 27)[4] and Executive Order No. 228 (E.O. 228),  Lots 3, 4, and 7 and parts of Lots 1, 5, and 6 were placed under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) program of the government.[5] The remaining parts of Lots 1, 5, and 6 were covered by Republic Act No. 6657 (R.A. 6657), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL).[6] As a consequence of these moves, the properties were acquired by the DAR and thereafter distributed to the proper farmer-beneficiaries.
2012-02-01
PERALTA, J.
Under the circumstances, the directive of the Office of the President for the DAR to ascertain whether or not petitioner's landholdings may be placed under CARP was proper.  To be sure, it is the DAR that is procedurally prepared to handle such controversies and is better suited to resolve such factual issues in the exercise of its mandate to implement the CARP and its vested quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters.[49]
2010-11-22
BRION, J.
In the present case, instead of conducting a preliminary conference, the MTC immediately referred the case to the DARAB. This was contrary to the rules.  Besides, Section 2[40] of P.D. No. 316, which required the referral of a land dispute case to the Department of Agrarian Reform for the preliminary determination of the existence of an agricultural tenancy relationship, has indeed been repealed by Section 76[41] of R.A. No. 6657 in 1988.
2010-06-18
PEREZ, J.
In the same breath, petitioner contends that DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, was made in violation of Section 65[11] of Republic Act No. 6657 because it covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to other agricultural uses, such as the conversion of agricultural lands or areas that have been reclassified by the LGUs or by way of Presidential Proclamations, to residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses on or after 15 June 1988.  According to petitioner, there is nothing in Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 or in any other provision of law that confers to the DAR the jurisdiction or authority to require that non-awarded lands or reclassified lands be submitted to its conversion authority.  Thus, in issuing and enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
2010-06-18
PEREZ, J.
More so, Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, which Opinion has been recognized in many cases decided by this Court, clarified that after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 the DAR has been given the authority to approve land conversion.[38]  Concomitant to such authority, therefore, is the authority to include in the definition of agricultural lands "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" for purposes of land use conversion.
2009-12-04
CARPIO MORALES, J.
The records show that Sangguniang Bayan and Association of Barangay Captains of Nasugbu filed before this Court petitions for intervention which were, however, denied by Resolution of June 5, 2006 for lack of standing.[4]
2009-11-27
BRION, J.
Respondent Agustin Dizon (Dizon) was the owner of an unirrigated land situated in Aranguren, Capas, Tarlac, with an area of 25.0 hectares and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 85458. On May 25, 1995, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) sent Dizon a Notice of Acquisition informing him that the government was taking over his property for distribution to twelve (12) qualified farmer-beneficiaries under the compulsory acquisition scheme of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), and that the LBP would determine the value of the property pursuant to Executive Order No. 405[4] dated June 14, 1990.
2009-11-25
PERALTA, J.
Earlier, however, on July 15, 1993, petitioners filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga, their respective applications for retention[9] over Lot No. 166, at five (5) hectares each, pursuant to Section 6[10] of Republic Act No. 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (RA No. 6657).[11]
2009-04-02
TINGA, J.
Compounding its error, the RTC also stated that following Section 65[77] of Rep. Act No. 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, "only the DAR, upon proper application... can authorize the reclassification or conversion of the use of the land from agricultural to residential, commercial or industrial." The citation is misleading. Section 4 of the same law provides for the scope of the agrarian reform program under the CARL as covering "all public and private agricultural lands, as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture."[78]Section 3(c) defines agricultural lands as "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land."[79] Obviously, if the property had already been classified as commercial land at the time of the enactment of the CARL, it does not fall within the class of agricultural lands which may be subject of conversion under Section 65 of that law. Section 65, as relied upon by the trial court, would have been of relevance only if it had been demonstrated by respondents that the property was still classified as agricultural when the CARL was enacted.
2009-04-02
TINGA, J.
Compounding its error, the RTC also stated that following Section 65[77] of Rep. Act No. 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, "only the DAR, upon proper application... can authorize the reclassification or conversion of the use of the land from agricultural to residential, commercial or industrial." The citation is misleading. Section 4 of the same law provides for the scope of the agrarian reform program under the CARL as covering "all public and private agricultural lands, as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture."[78]Section 3(c) defines agricultural lands as "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land."[79] Obviously, if the property had already been classified as commercial land at the time of the enactment of the CARL, it does not fall within the class of agricultural lands which may be subject of conversion under Section 65 of that law. Section 65, as relied upon by the trial court, would have been of relevance only if it had been demonstrated by respondents that the property was still classified as agricultural when the CARL was enacted.
2009-01-19
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In the interregnum, Republic Act No. 6657[11] was signed into law by then President Corazon Aquino. The said law took effect on 15 June 1988, after it was published in two newspapers of general circulation. Republic Act No. 6657 was enacted to promote social justice to the landless farmers and provide "a more equitable distribution and ownership of land with due regard for the rights of landowners to just compensation and to the ecological needs of the nation.[12] Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6657 provides that the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law shall cover all public and private agricultural lands including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture. Section 7 provides that rice and corn lands under Presidential Decree No. 27, among other lands, will comprise Phase One of the acquisition plan and distribution program. Section 75 states that the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228[13] and No. 229,[14] and other laws not inconsistent with Republic Act No. 6657 shall have suppletory effect.[15]
2008-11-27
REYES, R.T., J.
The records do not show when respondents or their father, Florentino Dumlao, was formally notified of the expropriation. The records, however, bear out that the bank sent Florentino Dumlao a letter stating that it had approved the land transfer claim involving that property covered by TCT No. T-1180 on November 5, 1990. Moreover, the various Land Valuation Summary and Farmers Undertakings showing the valuation of the land transferred to the farmers-beneficiaries were approved on May 17, 1989[55] and July 21, 1989.[56] It is thus crystal clear that even after the passage of RA No. 6657 in 1988, neither petitioner nor the DAR had settled the matter of just compensation with respondents as landowners.
2007-02-06
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
On 12 October 1995, AFC and HPI voluntarily offered to sell the above parcels of land to the government.[6]  After the initial processing at the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS)[7] application of AFC and HPI, it was referred to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) for initial valuation.  On 16 October 1996, AFC and HPI received separately from the DAR's Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of Davao province a notice of land acquisition and valuation, informing AFC that the value of the properties has been placed at P86,900,925.88 or P165,484.47 per hectare[8] while HPI's properties were valued at P164,478,178.14.[9]  Both AFC and HPI considered the valuations unreasonably low and inadequate as just compensation for the properties.
2006-11-20
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Likewise, in the recent case of Heirs of Francisco R. Tantoco, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,[26] we held that expropriation of landholdings covered by R.A. No. 6657 take place, not on the effectivity of the Act on June 15, 1988, but on the payment of just compensation.
2006-11-20
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Section 18 of R.A. No. 6657 mandates that the LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP or as may be finally determined by the court as the just compensation for the land. In determining just compensation, the cost of the acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the government to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.[32]
2006-06-30
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The recommendation of the Hacienda Maria Action Team to have the EPs cancelled and the lots covered under the Republic Act No. 6657,[29]  with the farmer- beneficiaries later on being issued with CLOAs, would only delay the application of agrarian reform laws to the disputed 277.5008 hectares, leading to the expenditure of more time and resources of the government.
2006-05-05
AZCUNA, J.
Simply put, just compensation is the fair market value or the price which a buyer will pay without coercion and a seller will accept without compulsion.[37] Evidently, the law recognizes that the land's exact value, or the just compensation to be given the landowner, cannot just be assumed; it must be determined with certainty before the land titles are transferred.[38] Expropriation of landholdings covered by R.A. No. 6657 take place, not on the effectivity of the Act on June 15, 1988, but on the payment of just compensation.
2005-11-17
CARPIO, J.
On 8 August 1963, RA 3844 or the Agricultural Land Reform Code[21] abolished and outlawed share tenancy and put in its stead the agricultural leasehold system.[22]  On 10 September 1971, Republic Act No. 6389 ("RA 6389") amending RA 3844 ("RA 3844 as amended") declared share tenancy relationships as contrary to public policy.[23] RA 6389 did not entirely repeal Republic Act No. 1199[24] and RA 3844 even if RA 6389 substantially modified them.[25] Subsequently, Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 ("RA 6657") took effect on 15 June 1988.  RA 6657 only expressly repealed Section 35 of RA 3844 as amended.[26]  Thus, RA 6657 is the prevailing law in this case.  The harvests in dispute are for the years 1992-1993 or after the effectivity of RA 6657.
2005-03-31
CARPIO MORALES, J.
As the above-quoted provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law show, only those private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture are covered by it.[58] As priorly related, Victor Ragay, who was appointed by the trial court to conduct an ocular inspection of the property, observed in his report that only three (3) to four (4) hectares were planted with sugarcane while the rest of the property was not suitable for planting as the soil was full of limestone.[59] He also remarked that the sugarcanes were only 3 feet in height and very lean,[60] whereas sugarcanes usually grow to a height of 3 to 6 meters (about 8 to 20 feet) and have stems 2 to 5 centimeters (1-2 inches) thick.[61]
2005-03-16
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
SRRDC cites the case of Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. DAR,[55] wherein it was ruled that lands not devoted to agricultural activity and not classified as mineral or forest by the DENR and its predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as approved by the HLURB and its preceding competent authorities prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 6657 on June 15, 1988, are outside the coverage of the CARP.  Said ruling, however, finds no application in the present case.  As previously stated, Municipal Ordinance No. 110-54 of the Municipality of Cabuyao did not provide for any retroactive application nor did it convert existing agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, or institutional.  Consequently, the subject property remains agricultural in nature and therefore within the coverage of the CARP.